Each university's data is separate
Every table that holds university data has a tenant, and access to it is decided inside the database by row-level security, not by the screens. A screen can hide a button, but only the database can refuse a request, so a changed or stale screen cannot do more than a person is allowed to.
A test run before every release proves that one university cannot read another's data, and the build fails if a new table is added without being classified.
Signing in
Sign-up is by invitation only. A rule in the database refuses any email address that has no pending invitation, so nobody can register themselves.
Administrators, registrars, teachers, finance staff and librarians must also use an authenticator app. Until they pass that step the database withholds their permissions. Sessions end after a period of inactivity.
No master key
The web app and the API use only the public key and act as the signed-in person. No service-role key is used anywhere in the code, and the app refuses to start if it is handed a secret key or a service-role key.
Secrets such as the email provider's key and the Stripe key live only on the server, never in the web app.
A record of what happened
An activity log records what staff did, using ids and counts and never names or notes. Case trails, attendance changes with their reasons, enrolment history and the Autopilot run log cannot be edited or deleted. Payments, waivers, credit notes and refunds are entries: a mistake is corrected by a new entry, never by changing an old one.
Payments
Card payments go through Stripe straight to the university's own Stripe account. Aulora never holds the money. The browser never sees a Stripe key and cannot choose the amount: the server asks the database what is owed. A payment is recorded only from a message Stripe signed, once, and a repeat changes nothing.
Check-in evidence
A check-in code is worked out from a secret and the clock, so no code is stored. Each check-in is signed with a key held by the student's phone that the browser will not export, and the database refuses a request that was changed, signed by another key, older than two minutes, or already used.
Locations are stored rounded to about 11 metres and kept only for the period the university sets, 90 days by default. Students cannot read the code, the flags, the evidence or the device list.
Where data and services are
The database runs on Supabase in the Sydney region (Australia). Email is sent through Brevo. Card payments use Stripe. Student records are never copied to test environments, which use invented people.
A few features contact free public services from the person's browser: map tiles from OpenStreetMap and Esri, address search through Nominatim, traced buildings through Overpass, and book details through Open Library. Only what the feature needs is sent, such as an ISBN or the area being viewed. A university that does not want this can leave those features unused.
What we are still building, and the limits
- Check-in can still be forged by a determined student with a modified phone. Signing removes the cheap attacks and leaves evidence for review. It does not make forgery impossible.
- Today a lost authenticator device is reset by the Aulora team after checking who is asking. Self-service reset by another administrator is on our list.
- Roles are fixed. Roles scoped to a department or campus, and single sign-on with a university's own identity provider, are planned.
- We have not yet had an independent penetration test. One is planned before the first university goes live.